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The capital-labor settlement after the Second World War provided for recog-
nition of free, adversarial collective bargaining between unions and employers.
But as the papers in this volume show,
1 in most Western European countries it
also included arrangements at the workplace for collective consultation be-
tween management and workforce, in the form of works councils. Supple-
menting distributive collective bargaining, and indeed sometimes preceding it,
works councils were to concern themselves with production issues and ways
of increasing productivity through cooperation in the production sphere. Today
the remarkable fact of the almost universal establishment of works councils
after 1945 in otherwise very different national contexts, as an integral part of
a worldwide recasting of the political economy of capitalism after the eco-
nomic and political catastrophes of the interwar period, is largely forgotten.
Works councils, to be sure, differed considerably between countries. In
some, such as the Netherlands and France, they were chaired by the employer;
elsewhere they were worker-only bodies. In Germany, the Netherlands, and
France, councils were based on legislation; in Sweden and Italy, by contrast,
they were set up through national collective agreement, making councils
union-based and defining a pattern that lasts until the present day. More im-
pressive than the differences, however, were the commonalities of the various
council systems and the simultaneity of their establishment. In all six countries
under study, laws on works councils were passed or national agreements signed
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almost immediately after the war had ended (table 11.1).
2 West Germany came
last with the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952; but the West German state
had been founded only in 1949, and in fact works councils had been running
most of what was left of its devastated industry in the first few years after 1945.
Even Francoist Spain passed works council legislation in 1947, recognizing a
need for some form of collective organization of workers at the workplace even
under an authoritarian dictatorship.
Typically postwar works councils were kept strictly separate from collective
bargaining. More or less consciously following Sinzheimer's 1920 Entwurf
einer Arbeitsverfassung for the Weimar Republic, collective bargaining was
reserved to unions as their exclusive domain, and indeed to nationally central-
ized unions negotiating with equally centralized employers' associations.
3 In
this way, distributional conflict was moved out of the workplace into a national,
political arena, where it could be integrated in a broader context and traded off
against Keynesian full-employment policy or a universalist welfare state. In
any case, given the destructions of the war and the pressing need to rebuild the
Continent's shattered economies, collective bargaining did not and could not
play much of a role in the immediate postwar years, and in most countries had
yet to develop fully. In Germany, in fact, where works councils were to become
particularly important later, unions concentrated on collective wage bargaining
only with great hesitation and only during the beginning "economic miracle"
of the second half of the 1950s when their original objective, a complete
Neuordnung of the economy on the basis of a multitiered system of parity co-
determination, had finally eluded them. Works councils, of course, although
quite different ones from those that were enacted in 1952, had played a central
part in German unions' economic democracy (Wirtschaftsdemokratie) proj-
ect—which was one reason why the Works Constitution Act was enacted only
against their resistance.
4
Outside Germany and Spain, in countries where pluralist industrial relations
emerged or reemerged earlier, works councils were introduced with union and
employer support as a counterbalance to institutionalized adversarialism. Swe-
den and Italy, where councils were created by collective agreement, are partic-
ularly instructive in this respect, but the situation was essentially the same else-
2. In Italy, the first major national agreement on works councils (commissioni interne) was
reached in already 1943, before the restoration of free unions. Until 1947 the commissioni had
collective bargaining rights.
3. This was, of course, different in Spain, where there were no unions and where the wage
settlements dictated by the government could not be made to stick at the workplace. As a conse-
quence Spanish works councils had to serve as outlets for and mediators in distributional conflict,
with "cooperation," as it were, ensured at the national level—the reverse of the normal pattern.
The fact that almost 20 years after Franco Spanish works councils still negotiate on wages is
another impressive example of the stickiness of institutions and the formative power of original
institutional design decisions.
4. Interestingly, this was similar in the Netherlands, where the unions were less than enthusiastic
about the 1950 legislation, which they regarded as a watered-down version of previous Social
Democratic proposals that had emphasized economic democracy at both the firm and sector levels.315 Works Councils in Western Europe: From Consultation to Participation
where. In both countries, a powerful union movement coming out of the war
was willing, at least for a transition period, to respect managerial prerogative
in the organization of production in exchange for employer acceptance of,
among other things, nationwide collective bargaining. In Italy, unions and em-
ployers had even before the end of the war agreed to work together to build a
democratic nation after the devastations of fascism and the German occupa-
tion.
5 The dominant spirit was one of centrist moderation in both camps,
brought about by the shared experience of the resistance movement and influ-
enced by the same Social-Catholic doctrine that subsequently was to become
important in Germany as well. In Sweden, under quite different conditions,
employers had in 1945 and 1946 beaten back an attempt by the radical Left to
move quickly toward some form of socialism. One result was a shift in the
leadership of the labor movement toward more moderate factions willing to
pursue their objectives in a gradualistic way through, among other things, col-
lective bargaining.
Remarkably, however, in Sweden just as in Italy and the rest of Europe,
neither unions nor employers believed that collective bargaining alone was
enough for a socially sustainable and economically productive reorganization
of employment relations. Together with collective bargaining, the two sides
also agreed, almost as a matter of course, that both the exercise of managerial
prerogative at the workplace and the conduct of distributional conflict at the
national level needed to be supplemented by workplace-based consultation be-
tween management and labor. Underlying this was a shared assumption that
unilateral management was unable to provide for an optimal utilization of the
forces of production, and that institutionalized conflict was less divisive and
more socially benevolent if the resources available for distribution were more
plentiful. By taking the edge out of the exercise of managerial discretion and
the pursuit of political-distributional conflict, consultation at the workplace
was to facilitate both. Like the acceptance of pluralism, this view became a
constituent part of an almost universal consensus across class lines and na-
tional boundaries in the formative years of the postwar industrial relations
system.
The only major exceptions from the general movement toward works coun-
cils after 1945 were the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United King-
dom. Several explanations come to mind for this, but clearly more research is
required, especially on the British case. As for the United States, a major factor
seems to have been the history of the struggle of bona fide unionism against
company unions, as reflected in the Wagner Act's emphasis on adversarialism
and its strong suspicion of nonadversarial, nonunion, cooperative forms of
"labor organization" at the workplace. Moreover, unlike Western Europe,
the American economy had not been destroyed in the war, and indeed America
5. To be sure, unlike in Sweden, this period came to an end in 1947 at the latest, when it gave
way to two decades of union exclusion and authoritarian or paternalistic management practices.316 Wolfgang Streeck
entered the postwar era as the largest and leading industrial nation, with no
need to rebuild its productive base through class cooperation. Also, American
employers had not been discredited by cooperation with a dictatorship or a
foreign aggressor and came out of the war as strong and as determined as ever
to protect their right to manage. Apart from the rapid spread of seniority rules,
that right was not much contested by American "business unions," except for a
few easily defeated attempts especially by the UAW in the immediate postwar
years. Not least, collective bargaining had never been firmly centralized in the
United States, where in the unionized sector highly independent union locals
occupied the organizational space in which works councils existed in Europe,
making it difficult to imagine a stable and mutually supportive division of func-
tions between unions and councils.
The British case is more difficult to understand, given that there was before
and after the Second World War some experience with "productivity councils"
and other consultative arrangements. On the other hand, Britain was among
the winners of the war and took a long time to realize the depth of the economic
problems it was facing. British employers therefore saw no urgent need for
institutionalized cooperation at the point of production, especially since Brit-
ish unions were not much interested in co-determination themselves. Rather
than on participation in managerial decisions, they had placed their hopes on
nationalization, and in fact more industrial capacity than anywhere else outside
the Communist bloc was expropriated by the post-1945 Labour government.
Also, unlike in the United States, there was no tradition in Britain of legislative
intervention in industrial relations, with the legal system long and firmly com-
mitted to abstentionism and both unions and employers insisting on "volunta-
rism" as the only adequate way of regulating employment relations. Politics
was unlikely to change this. Given the very large number of unions, many of
them small, that had little to gain from union-independent, unitary workplace
representation, the Labour party saw no reason, and indeed thoroughly lacked
the political capacity, to institutionalize works councils by legislation; the Con-
servative party, for its part, continued to defend the managerial prerogative so
dear to its core clientele. Arguably because of the weak legal supports of its
industrial relations system, Britain later came to be the first major country in
Europe in which the postwar structure of centralized collective bargaining
broke down and gave way to workplace bargaining.
Postwar works councils, in the countries where they existed, were consulta-
tive bodies. While they sometimes did have paternalistic traits, they were not
set up by employers to crowd out unions, and could not have been given the
unions' preoccupation with national-level, "political" bargaining. At the same
time, councils typically had no and claimed no rights to co-determination and
were generally not equipped to perform representational functions. The only,
limited exception in this latter respect was West Germany with its Weimar
tradition of economic democracy. Everywhere else, the early works councils
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their main and sole purpose was to enable employers to consult with their
workforces on how to improve economic performance, listen to constructive
proposals growing out of workers' everyday work experience, and in the pro-
cess build consensus for managerial decisions in the pursuit of economic
progress.
11.2 Decay of Consultative Councils
During the 1950s and 1960s the consultative works councils of the early
postwar years fell into disuse, and again the experience was shared by most
European countries with the exception of West Germany and, to some extent,
the Netherlands. Since mainstream industrial relations research outside Ger-
many has grossly neglected works councils,
6 little is known about the reasons
for this once more astonishingly parallel development. Following the papers in
this volume, it would seem that as national economies and industrial relations
systems consolidated, both employers and unions lost interest in works coun-
cils and in part began to regard them as potentially dangerous to their newly
established positions. Not only were councils' economic benefits found in-
creasingly doubtful, but there also seems to have been a growing conviction
that the separation of consultation and representation, on the possibility of
which the early postwar councils had been premised, was untenable in the
longer term and that works councils were bound to undermine either manage-
rial prerogative or national unions' representational monopoly or both.
As to unions, it seems that the more they became established parties to sec-
toral or national collective bargaining, the more they began to regard works
councils as potential agents of Betriebspatriotismus: of particularistic interests
of employed workers in the economic well-being of their employer, undermin-
ing worker solidarity across enterprise lines, potentially replacing it with soli-
darity between individual employers and their workforces across class lines,
and serving as an organizational infrastructure for what has been referred to as
"wildcat cooperation." Fears like these were clearly strongest in countries
where councils were not union-based. But as distributional conflict became
more intense with the return of prosperity, there was a general decline in the
confidence of unions that employers would respect the difference between con-
sultation and representation and abstain from using councils to lure their work-
forces into local alliances undermining national or sectoral unions' conflic-
tual capacities.
6. In part, this may have been because on the European continent industrial relations as a disci-
pline took off only in the late 1960s, when the councils of the early postwar period were no more
than a distant memory. Moreover, European students of industrial relations tended to sympathize
with the views of the unions, which in the formative years of the discipline were eager to dissociate
themselves from the postwar council tradition. Furthermore, in the Anglo-American countries
from which the discipline was largely imported, councils were either unknown or almost by defi-
nition regarded as paternalistic and antiunion, and not part of "good," i.e., union-inclusive, pluralist
industrial relations.318 Wolfgang Streeck
Interestingly, employers seem to have withdrawn from works councils out
of exactly the opposite concerns. Having successfully restored legitimacy for
their control over the workplace, they increasingly began to view councils,
whether union-based or not, as potential entryways for unions and thus as
threats to their reestablished right to manage. It is easy to imagine that such
fears should have induced employers to use councils paternalistically for build-
ing antiunion coalitions with their workforces—confirming unions' worst
fears and in turn inducing them to try and capture the councils for themselves,
so as to prevent them being captured by the employers. The only way out of
this self-reinforcing, escalating "spiral of low trust" (Fox) was to agree, more
or less tacitly, on abandoning councils altogether.
Convergence on this solution was made possible by the fact that the early
economic reasons for employers and unions to seek institutionalized consulta-
tion at the workplace seem soon to have fallen by the wayside. The 1950s
and 1960s in Europe were a period of rapid advance of Fordist-Taylorist mass
production. Consensus for "rationalization" was increasingly procured by firm
expectations of continued economic growth, as well as by generally accepted
perceptions of technological change as linear, predetermined, and self-
propelled, with little if any space for alternatives or choice. Collective consul-
tation with workers seemed of little use where compliance with managerial
authority appeared to be assured by, or could easily be bought with, the eco-
nomic benefits of its aggressive exercise, and where the efficient organization
of production was regarded, not just by employers, as a matter of technological
expertise beyond the reach and competence of democratic participation. In this
environment, just as employers found it easy to renounce their past belief in the
productive contribution of collective participation, unions typically abandoned
their postwar concern with production and concentrated on the distribution
of its results, increasingly refusing to become involved in responsibility for
cooperation at the workplace either directly or, by condoning works councils
regardless of their potential risks for union solidarity, indirectly.
But as the papers in this volume indicate, the demise of postwar councils
outside West Germany and, in part, the Netherlands was also related to more
narrowly institutional factors. While works councils typically had no rights to
co-determination, they could expect consultation to give them access to privi-
leged information and some, however limited, influence on managerial deci-
sions. To this extent, consultation might have performed minimal representa-
tional functions for workers. The problem was, however, that employers were
free to decide when and on what to initiate consultation. As decisions did not
depend on the results, and sanctions for not consulting were weak or nonexis-
tent, the early council systems entailed an ever-present temptation for employ-
ers not to consult if this might cause them discomfort. The sheer presence of
this temptation, in turn, was bound to cause suspicions on the part of workers
that when they were being consulted, it was only because management per-
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to workers it would not take place. Lacking representative institutions at the
workplace, the temptation for workers then was to try to use consultation as a
substitute for workplace collective bargaining. As long as consultation was
voluntary, workers were prone to regard works councils as management tools;
while employers were inclined to use them as such, as well as to suspect work-
ers of trying to use them for adversarial purposes.
11.3 German Exceptionalism
For our further argument, it is crucial to understand why the decay of the
postwar council system should not have been replicated in West Germany. Be-
cause of the division of Germany, the Communist party, which governed the
eastern part of the country, was largely absent in the Federal Republic. Among
other things this helped contain the radicalization of the union movement in
West Germany's newly prosperous economy during the reconstruction period.
7
Division also contributed importantly to the fact that the postwar political unity
of West German unionism did not come apart later, as it did in Italy; with
Communist influence weak or nonexistent, neither Social Democratic nor
Catholic unionists found it necessary or attractive to break away from the uni-
tary union federation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). One conse-
quence was continued strong influence on national union strategy of Catholic
social doctrine, which was far less hostile to interclass cooperation, especially
at the workplace, than both socialism and communism.
This is not to say that German unions were not afraid of the paternalistic
and syndicalist potential of works councils; in fact they were, and had very
good reasons to be. Unlike the works councils of the Weimar Republic, the
councils that had been created by a conservative government under the Betrieb-
sverfassungsgesetz of 1952 were not as a matter of course conceived to be
union controlled. Important elements in the governing coalition intended the
works councils of 1952 to have a potential to serve as union alternatives, and
it was partly for this purpose that, unlike works councils elsewhere in Europe
at the time, they were endowed with rudimentary rights of representation
through co-determination. But while this might have been reason enough for
most other union movements to stay away from the council system and to try
to destroy it, postwar German unionism can be understood only against the
background of its consuming preoccupation with Mitbestimmung: the equal
sharing of control over economic decisions between capital and labor at all
levels, including the enterprise. This defining project, which incidentally made
it also more difficult for German unions than for others to move on to collective
bargaining pure and simple, or at least made for a programmatically institu-
tionalized bad conscience about any such tendency, effectively prevented a re-
7. A related reason for moderation was the relative weakness of German unions at the time,
certainly compared to the Scandinavian countries or France.320 Wolfgang Streeck
jection of works councils even at a time when they might still have been used
by employers for antiunion purposes: even where they were, they somehow also
incorporated the promise of worker participation in the management of enter-
prises, which German unions stubbornly refused to regard as solely vested in
property rights. Withdrawing from existing works councils while calling for
extended co-determination would have been perceived as deeply and self-
defeatingly contradictory. Here Social Democratic and Social-Catholic think-
ing converged, further fortifying the cohesion of the unitary union movement
and protecting the union productivism of the first postwar years from being
superseded by an exclusive concern with distributive politics and wage bar-
gaining.
There were yet other reasons why German unions could not, in the same
way as unions elsewhere, walk away from works councils. Among them was
the prewar tradition of councils, going back to the revolution of 1918 and the
Weimar Reichsverfassung of 1920. But most important, it would seem, was
the councils' strong legal foundation that made for quite distinctive and, at the
time, unique institutional dynamics. Given the way the 1952 legislation had
been written, German unions would have found it impossible to undo the coun-
cils in the 1950s and 1960s, even if they had wanted to and even if they had
won the support of the employers for this. Not only were councils of the state's
and not of their or of the employers' making, forcing unions just as employers
to find ways of living with them; more important, unlike works councils in
other countries, German councils did after all have some effective representa-
tive functions that gave them legitimacy among workers and that neither unions
nor employers could circumvent. While in hindsight these may not have
amounted to much, they did intrude on managerial prerogative, at least in that
they made employers defer certain decisions, especially on personnel matters,
until the works council had had an opportunity to offer a counterproposal. In
addition, the fact that councils commanded considerable support from workers
forced unions to acknowledge that workers had workplace-specific interests
which, to be adequately represented, needed decentralized in addition to cen-
tralized joint regulation. In the 1950s and 1960s, German unions thus learned
to share their representational functions, and German employers their mana-
gerial powers, with legally based works councils, preparing the ground for the
extension of co-determination that was to come in the 1970s.
As has been mentioned, an important factor that made it easier for German
unionism to reconcile itself with the 1952 works councils was the survival of
its political unity. Absence of political division facilitated the rapprochement
between unions and councils not just ideologically but also organizationally:
lacking significant competition, the unitary industrial unions affiliated to the
DGB were able gradually to grow into the unitary works council system and
take it over from the inside, turning legally based works councils into chosen
union instruments for representing workers at the workplace. This process, to
be sure, went far from smoothly. For a while, the suspicions harbored against321 Works Councils in Western Europe: From Consultation to Participation
councils by external unions and the left wing of the movement were so strong
that considerable investments were made in separate union workplace organi-
zations (Vertrauensleute), even when the vast majority of council members had
long come to be elected from union lists.
Slowly, however, this began to change. As unions saw their workplace lead-
ers take over the councils and exercise council rights as union rights, their
main problem with the system increasingly became, not its existence as such,
but the fact that the rights it provided to workers were so limited. A model of
how councils could be more powerful while at the same time remaining firmly
under union control was offered by coal and steel co-determination, a regime
whose extension to the rest of German industry was the DGB's main demand
on the road to full Mitbestimmung. Having learned from coal and steel how
effectively to infuse representation in consultation, German unions came to
cherish the many other advantages a well-established, workplace-based coun-
cil system offers to industrial unions engaged in centralized wage bar-
gaining—such as access to information, protection of external unions' strike
monopoly, containment of local wage drift, prevention of fragmentation by
occupation or skill, competitive disadvantagement for splinter unions, easy de
facto union recognition, assistance in the recruitment of members, effective
local implementation of collective agreements, and assured union access to
workplace-specific interests that otherwise might seek different outlets. As
early as the second half of the 1960s, then, external union opposition to works
councils had become largely rhetorical, and in practice, unions and councils
had made their peace with each other, the former working closely with and
through the latter in serving members and workers at the workplace.
11.4 Rise of Workplace Representation in the 1970s
The Europe-wide wave of unofficial strikes in 1968 and 1969 caused the
first major revision in the institutional arrangements that had governed postwar
industrial relations for two decades. Again, the parallels between countries are
impressive. Most of the literature describes the longer-term results of the
strikes as a transformation of both industrial relations and parliamentary de-
mocracy toward more institutionalized participation of national unions in
broad areas of public policy making, under labels like "neocorporatism"
(Schmitter) or "political exchange" (Pizzorno). But while this was certainly a
very important part of what happened, no less central to the update of the
postwar settlement in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the recognition by
governments, employers, and unions of the workplace as a site for legitimate
interest representation and of a role for unions as vital participants in it.
The reorganization of the workplace to satisfy newly discovered demands
for "industrial democracy" and "participation" responded to the fact that the
strikes had almost universally been called, not by external national unions, but
by local workplace leaders. External unions, just as governments and employ-322 Wolfgang Streeck
ers, saw the strikes above all as a very serious warning that centralized union-
ism and collective bargaining were about to lose control over the articulation
of workplace-specific interests—or, more precisely, had for whatever reason
failed to develop capacities to represent powerful worker interests that were
left unrepresented only at the risk of industrial disorder and social unrest. In
part, the unrepresented interests that were perceived as having caused the crisis
had to do with wages and, most important, wage differentials, calling into
question the leveling wage policies of national and sectoral unions especially
in countries like Sweden. But very clearly, other grievances were also involved,
in particular over rationalization, technical change, and working conditions. In
this respect, the writing on the wall was that after two decades of Fordist-
Taylorist progress, its peace formula—assured growth as a reward for voiceless
acquiescence with managerial decisions—was coming apart, with workers de-
termined to claim a role in the regulation of their working conditions and refus-
ing to leave the management of the workplace to employers and their industrial
engineers in return for, supposedly, ever-rising material payoffs.
When the strikes were over, European unions were stronger than ever since
the immediate postwar years. National union leaders were courted by govern-
ments and employers as the only possible managers of what was seen as deep
and threatening discontent. In particular, unions were asked to contribute to
the restoration of industrial order in two ways. At the national level, they were
urged to help contain the rising inflation so as to enable governments to con-
tinue to provide for full employment without having to sacrifice monetary sta-
bility: this was the incomes policy part of neocorporatism that came to attract
most of the attention of researchers. In addition, however, and partly as an
advance reward for their expected collaboration in macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, unions were given, or were able to get for themselves, better access to the
workplace and an assured role in the representation of workplace-specific in-
terests.
Again, there were differences between countries. In some, "qualitative" de-
mands of workers for "industrial democracy" were eagerly attended to and
even cultivated in order to divert workers' attention from "quantitative" wage
issues, in an attempt simultaneously to shore up national unions' solidaristic
wage policies and facilitate government efforts to bring down inflation. Else-
where, the reforms that followed the strike wave initiated a decentralization of
collective bargaining on the vague and sometimes desperate hope that national
unions would somehow be able to impose a measure of discipline on their
newly empowered workplace representatives. But the overall tendency was al-
ways the same: to increase the representativeness of workplace industrial rela-
tions by making space for effective expression of workplace-specific worker
interests, so as to prevent a recurrence of the breakdown of central governance
that had in 1968 and 1969 so fundamentally shaken the industrial and politi-
cal order.
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and classes, that restoration of social peace at the workplace was impossible
short of major steps toward genuine representation. Paternalistic solutions, like
expanded voluntary consultation, were never seriously considered. Govern-
ments and employers all over Europe assumed as a matter of course that union
substitutes would not do the job and that the only realistic policy was to allow
unions into the workplace lest other forces, less responsible and more difficult
to include in macroeconomic stabilization efforts, absorbed the discontent and
thrived on it. At the same time, increasing the representativeness of workplace
institutions required different approaches and was differently risky in different
countries. It was comparatively easy in West Germany, where, given the way
industrial relations had developed after the war, the solution that offered itself
was to satisfy long-standing union demands for more rights for works councils
and, in general, for expansion of co-determination.
Comparative analysis reveals the logic of this approach to deviate signifi-
cantly from received accounts. In many cases the German strike wave had been
led, not by unorganized activists or Vertrauensleute, but by works councils,
certifying the councils' meanwhile developed status as de facto local unions
and demonstrating to national unions and employers that the political capacit-
ies of well-organized councils far exceeded what the law had intended them to
have. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 was passed by a reform government,
led by the Social Democratic party, at the demand of its main political allies,
the unions. Far from intending to keep the unions out of the workplace, it
actually brought them forcefully into it, albeit in a form that was least threaten-
ing to centralized collective bargaining and to the unions themselves. This the
act accomplished in three ways: by expanding the rights to information, con-
sultation, and co-determination of the meanwhile thoroughly unionized works
councils; by improving the access and strengthening the links of external
unions to councils; and by confirming the councils' strict exclusion from wage
bargaining, thereby protecting the primacy of external unions in this area, for-
mally over the works councils, but actually and more importantly over the in-
ternal unions that German councils had in the meantime become. In this way,
the 1972 legislation accomplished the remarkable feat of extending the powers
of workplace union organizations vis-a-vis the employer while at the same
time stabilizing centralized collective bargaining, and in fact did the latter in
part by doing the former.
8
The German solution to the Europe-wide problem of how to increase the
8. It might be mentioned that at the time even more ambitious projects were pursued by Ger-
many unionists that remained unrealized in the 1972 legislation. Perhaps because (partly) repre-
sentative works councils were already an established element in German industrial relations, some
union groups had already begun to think beyond the immediate exigencies of the period and devel-
oped concepts of more decentralized and direct participation, especially of work groups, in the
organization of work (Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz). In the early 1970s these were rejected by
a majority of union leaders, who were afraid that they might undermine union and works council
representation. Today, in the context of post-Taylorism work reform, they have forcefully returned
on the agenda.324 Wolfgang Streeck
representativeness of workplace industrial relations without destroying the
possibility of macroeconomic concertation—and indeed in order to preserve
it—had many facets. But in the main it involved a merger of a range of repre-
sentative functions typically performed by unions into the structure of consul-
tation between employers and their workforces that had been created after the
war to support cooperation in production. By enriching consultation with rep-
resentation—a pattern that, as has been noted, had begun to develop long be-
fore the crisis of the late 1960s—the German approach saved consultation
from attrition. By including representative bodies in workplace cooperation, it
also bridged the cleavage between cooperation and representation and over-
came the association of representation with adversarialism that was so charac-
teristic of the initial postwar structure of industrial relations elsewhere. In the
process, as they became associated with representation—that is, the expression
of interests and the exercise of rights—consultation and cooperation ceased to
be merely voluntary and became more reliable and trustworthy for both sides.
Merging workplace consultation and representation also, at least for a while,
shielded centralized distributive bargaining in Germany from both excessive
conflict and excessive cooperation at the workplace.
The genius of this approach, and the advantages it bestowed on German
industrial relations and the German economy in the difficult 1970s and 1980s,
can best be seen in comparison with other countries. By and large, the same
merger of consultation and representation was to occur there as well, in re-
sponse to changed and very demanding economic conditions, but later, less
comfortably, and often precariously incomplete. Where, as was the typical
case, the postwar council system had withered away or forever lost the respect
of the unions, there was in the years following the strikes simply no possibility
to integrate the new functions of workplace representation in a preexisting con-
sultative-cooperative structure. A partial exception to this was the Netherlands,
where a strong legal foundation had preserved the consultative council system
of 1950 in spite of its paternalistic elements. Here the government in 1971
half-heartedly reformed the councils to increase their representational capac-
ity—only to find itself forced to follow up with another law in 1979 finally
turning Dutch works councils into worker-only bodies, and in fact making
them more similar to their German counterparts than ever.
Everywhere else, the issue on the agenda at the time was not yet to combine
representation with consultation, but to enable the unions as the only plausible
representative agents of workers and as the lesser evil compared to unorga-
nized workplace activists, to insert themselves in the organizational space of
the workplace. Already in 1968, the French state found it advisable to legalize
the workplace union sections that had formed during the general strike and to
impose legal obligations on intransigent employers not to stand in their way.
Not much thought, if any, was given to empowering the 1945 councils as an
alternative. The same applied to Italy, where in 1970 the statuto dei lavoratori,
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appeared patently absurd at the time—created a legal base for union organiza-
tion at the workplace. And in Sweden, unions and the Social Democratic gov-
ernment bypassed the more or less defunct works councils that had been cre-
ated under the national agreement of 1946, even though they were exclusively
union based, and instead expanded industrial democracy by expanding union
rights to collective bargaining, deriving what was referred to with the German
word, Metbestemming, from the general right of unions to represent their
members.
Nota bene that law played a central role in the institutionalization of work-
place representation, not only in Germany and the Netherlands, but even in
countries where the postwar council system had been founded on collective
agreement, and even where the representational mechanisms that were being
created were union based, as in Sweden and, certainly formally, in Italy. This
is why the unofficial strike wave of the late 1960s was followed by the second
postwar wave of legislation on workplace industrial relations, beginning with
France in 1968 and arguably ending with the same country in 1982 (table
11.1). Indeed the main events were concentrated in the early 1970s—disre-
garding the late date of the Spanish legislation which reflected the uncertainties
of the transition period, the second Dutch law, and the protracted union-
employer negotiations in Sweden subsequent to the co-determination legisla-
tion of the 1970s.
The importance of legal intervention for the greater representativeness of
workplace industrial relations is shown by its use even in Sweden and Italy,
where it immediately raised puzzling questions of how to accommodate non-
unionized workers in a system in which unions were to hold exclusive legal
rights to collective representation. Different, and differently awkward, solu-
tions were found. While in Sweden the matter was resolved by the sheer force
of numbers, nonmembers of unions being a tiny minority, in Italy workplace
union organizations were pragmatically opened by the unions themselves to
nonmembers,
9 first to absorb and domesticate the radicalism of the spontane-
ous council movement of the autunno caldo and later to ensure that workforces
spoke, and cooperated, with the employer with one voice.
As remarkable as the ingenuity with which in particular Italian unions re-
sponded to the potential conflict between worker and union representation is
the fact that even the strongest unions could not rely on their strength alone in
establishing themselves as representatives in the workplace. Employer volunta-
rism was nowhere seen as a solution. Nor was collective bargaining, mostly
because employer resistance, when it came to the crunch, was too strong, and
also because workplace representation was to be established as a general right
of industrial citizenship regardless of one's place of employment. Where such
rights could not be vested in existing nonunion structures, and where the repre-
9. This included, e.g., the possibility of unions "legitimating," i.e., awarding formal status as a
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sentativeness of workplace industrial relations could be increased only through
an expansion of union rights—the case everywhere outside Germany and the
Netherlands—governments agreed to expand union rights by law, whatever the
legal and constitutional difficulties, taking into account that unions on their
own were unable to gain such rights.
1
0 And needing urgently to insert them-
selves in the new representational structures in the workplace, unions were
willing to call in the state even where they had traditionally been deeply op-
posed to legal intervention and, as in Sweden, recourse to legislation was cer-
tain to jeopardize established collective bargaining relations with employers.
11.5 Return of Consultation
Where, unlike in Germany and the Netherlands, the legally established rep-
resentational structures of the 1970s could not be attached to a preexisting
system of collective consultation, elements of consultation were gradually in-
fused into them in subsequent years, recreating in a new context features of
the first postwar council system that had fallen by the wayside in most of Eu-
rope during the reconstruction period, and reproducing in a remarkable case
of functional convergence certain key properties of the German and Dutch sys-
tems. Again, this happened along very different national trajectories and with
very different consequences for unions, employers, and the character of their
mutual relations.
The fusion of representation and consultation into what may be called a
new, integrated system of workplace participation developed least in Spain.
Although legally based, the Spanish works council comes closer than any other
mechanism of workplace representation in Europe to a workplace union organ-
ization pure and simple. In part, this is because Spanish councils have re-
mained agents of wage bargaining. But even more important has been the re-
fusal of the Spanish government in the mid-1980s to continue to support
centralized wage settlements through some form of neocorporatist political ex-
change, together with an economic policy that, perhaps inevitably, made the
scrapping of outdated industrial capacity its first priority even at the cost of
very high unemployment. In this political environment, Spanish unions and
works councils typically find themselves reduced to defending their members'
and voters' jobs, using what little power they have to resist industrial change.
Constructive participation in joint consultation is further impeded by vigorous
interunion competition. Moreover, having become associated with the defense
of declining industries and traditional labor market rigidities, Spanish unions
and works councils are not regarded by employers or, for that matter, by the
Socialist government as useful partners for collective consultation on produc-
10. In Spain, given the peculiarities of the country's history, the works council legislation of
1980 was effectively union rights legislation—whereas, e.g., in Italy the union rights legislation
of 1970 was effectively the equivalent of works council legislation.328 Wolfgang Streeck
tion, which further reduces the possibility of consultative functions being per-
formed by the council system.
More instructive than the Spanish is the French case. Unlike in Spain where
the central objective of employers was to establish and exercise their right to
shed labor, French employers felt economic pressures in the 1970s to "involve"
their workforces more deeply in production and began to invest heavily in the
development of "social relations" at the workplace. In their effort to reduce the
distance between management and a traditionally indifferent and suspicious
workforce, however, French employers were unable and unwilling to make use
of existing institutions. The postwar works councils having largely disap-
peared, neither the union-dominated personnel delegates nor the new work-
place union sections seemed suited to serve as conduits for collective consulta-
tion, and indeed neither the unions nor the employers themselves were willing
to rebuild them for the purpose. In fact, intent as ever on excluding the unions
from the sphere of production, French employers perceived the lack of interest
among unions in collective consultation, and the limited capacity of the ex-
isting workplace institutions to support it, as an opportunity rather than a liabil-
ity. In the 1970s, they aggressively began to set up union-independent struc-
tures of direct participation controlled by themselves, aimed at both increasing
worker involvement and reversing the 1968 advance of unions into the work-
place.
As the French country chapter shows, while the strategy was quite success-
ful with regard to its second, more implicit objective, it failed to overcome the
limits of unilateral consultation without representation in generating coopera-
tion between employers and employees. The Socialist government after 1981
tried to resolve the impasse with its Auroux legislation, which was an attempt
to bring the unions as co-governors into the emerging employer-controlled di-
rect participation system, to shore up both its legitimacy and the unions' repre-
sentative capacity. In an important sense, this was intended to replicate the
German fusion of representation and consultation under French conditions by
connecting the enterprise committee, the most works-council-like of the three
legally supported institutions in the French workplace, both to the representa-
tional functions of unions—through the promotion of enterprise collective bar-
gaining—and to the social policies of the firm—through its new role in regu-
lating workforce "expression."
Many problems persist, however, and indications are that the French attempt
in the 1980s to institutionalize workplace participation in law failed to break
the impasse of the 1970s. A fundamental difficulty with the French system
seems to be that the capacity of enterprise committees to represent worker
interests is weak, due to both employer resistance and the occupation of crucial
representative functions by older layers of workplace institutions unconnected
to collective consultation. Adding to the problems is a rapid decline of unions,
which itself seems partly caused by the latter's inability and unwillingness to
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cooperative social relations and the worker interests that enter into them to
unilateral employer control. As a result, both the Auroux reforms and the new
human resource policies of employers seem to have become stuck halfway, as
reflected in a pervasive sense of stagnation and institutional deficiency, a grow-
ing "representation gap," and the efficiency gains of worker involvement re-
maining behind what is regarded as desirable.
A strikingly different situation developed in Italy, where in the 1980s in
particular collective consultation through works-council-like bodies returned,
often quite unintendedly, under the auspices of the system of institutionalized
workplace representation that had developed on the basis of the statute dei
lavoratori. Among the factors that make the Italian case so remarkable is that
there is nothing in Italian law that requires union workplace organizations to
cooperate with the employer in production matters, or that obliges employers
to consult with unions or councils or concede them rights to co-determination.
Nevertheless, as the Italian chapter shows, Italian union workplace organiza-
tions, encouraged by both employers and unions, have today on a broad scale
assumed core participative functions of works councils, testifying to the high
incentives for firms and workforces in the 1980s and 1990s to work together
to improve productivity and efficiency, and constituting a classic case of the
general trend in European industrial relations, after the institutional reforms of
the early 1970s, toward functional and structural merger of workplace consul-
tation and representation.
Comparing Italy to France, one cannot escape the conclusion that differ-
ences in union power and its legal institutionalization must have contributed
importantly to the different outcomes. Unlike their French counterparts, Italian
employers typically did not try to introduce new forms of work organization,
worker participation, and personnel management against the unions, not to
mention using work reorganization to deunionize their workforces. Certainly,
in part this was because of the strong productivist traditions of the Italian union
movement and because in Italy union participation in production issues was
much less likely to become a theme of ideological interunion competition than
in France. But even so, Italian employers could not possibly have hoped to
break their unions in the same way French employers obviously did. When
economic needs for cooperation became more pressing, they therefore did not
waste time and energy on predictably fruitless and unproductive efforts to cre-
ate a "union-free environment" in their plants, but instead constructively and
creatively explored the possibility of establishing cooperative relations with
their workforces. In this they were highly successful, in part because Italian
unions, in turn, felt safe enough to offer themselves as agents of workplace
participation without fear of losing their representational status and capacity.
The Swedish case is astonishingly similar to the Italian one, which is all the
more remarkable since many of the contextual conditions are radically differ-
ent. In Sweden, too, the union-controlled representative institutions that had
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of cooperative collective consultation in the workplace. When cooperation in
production was rediscovered as essential for economic performance, it was
consensually grafted onto workplace institutions that had originally been
meant as channels for unions representing the interests of their members
through collective bargaining rather than as sites of joint deliberation of em-
ployers and workers on how to improve efficiency. Just as in Italy, the initiative
seems to have come more from the employers than the unions, but it was later
fully embraced by the latter. With time, the militant resistance of Swedish em-
ployers to the co-determination legislation of the 1970s gave way to the insight
that, with unions stronger than anywhere else in the world, work reorganization
was possible only if consensually mediated through the same representative
institutions that employers had earlier rejected as interfering with their right
to manage. And, with an ideological tradition that was arguably even more
productivist than in Italy, Swedish unions, firmly established in their positions,
were in turn prepared to recognize that representation of workplace-related
interests that excludes cooperative interests in economic performance does so
only at its own peril.
In Sweden, and even more so in Italy—that is, in the two countries in which
workplace representation is based on unions only—whatever limits the new
configuration of representation and consultation places on managerial preroga-
tive are typically not formalized in law or collective agreement. This, of course,
is quite different from Germany and the Netherlands with their—union-
infused—statutory works council systems, in which what management may
and may not do tends to be formally regulated in great detail.
1
1 Compared to
the latter two countries, many of the consultation and co-determination rights
that Italian and Swedish employers concede to their workforces appear on the
surface to have been conceded voluntarily—with Swedish co-determination,
for example, often taking place in the absence of a local co-determination
agreement and formally regardless of the respective legislation. Further in-
spection, however, and comparison with a country like France make clear that
such "voluntarism" depends vitally on a balance of forces of which strong
local and national unions are an essential part. Moreover, there are also reasons
to believe that even with considerable union strength, employer voluntar-
ism can provide no more than an unstable base for consultation-cum-
representation, mainly because it offers employers more options than worker
representatives and considerably more control over workplace cooperation
than unions. It is for this reason in particular that, on the one hand, there are
strong voices among Italian unionists that argue for some kind of legislation
on both industrial democracy and union rights so as to make representative
consultation and workplace participation less dependent on the goodwill or
enlightened self-interest of employers, and that, on the other hand, many Swed-
11. In France and Spain, where unions are weak and works council rights limited, management
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ish observers are growing increasingly concerned about an impending "Japa-
nization" of the country's industrial order.
What were the structural forces that brought about the interpenetration of
consultation and representation, and the growth of a new kind of workplace
participation, that we have observed in so many European industrial relations
systems in the 1970s and 1980s? While we have no first-hand observations on
this, the papers in this volume unanimously point to certain fundamental
changes in the organization of decision making and production that occurred
during the period. In the Fordist decades immediately after the war, decision
making in most firms was centralized, and consultation served to improve the
information available to top management, as well as to prepare the ground
for the implementation of managerial decisions. Interest representation was
conceived as entirely dissociated from this process, especially since decisions
on work organization were supposed to be determined by the progress of tech-
nology and industrial engineering. As we have seen, these assumptions contrib-
uted to the decay of the first wave of consultative arrangements after the war.
All this began to change in the 1970s. With the broad move from mass pro-
duction to flexible production, the number of decisions and the speed with
which they had to be made increased dramatically—so much so that manage-
rial decision making had to be radically decentralized, altering fundamentally
the kind of productive cooperation that was required from workforces. With
the new intensity of decision making characteristic of the new, flexible organi-
zational structures, what firms needed were no longer just the experiential
knowledge and the passive compliance of workforces, as potentially produced
by traditional forms of—nonrepresentative—consultation, but their consen-
sus: their willingness to agree to continuous changes in rules and work proce-
dures under high uncertainty, as well as their involvement and commitment:
their willingness themselves to make decisions guided, not by bureaucratic
rules or superiors, but by internalized organizational objectives. Consensus,
involvement, and commitment, however, require that workers develop an active
interest in their work and "their" firm—or rather that the interests they have in
the firm be activated and redefined so as to make them contribute to the effi-
cient organization of the production process. Worker interests also come into
play because of the growing number of alternatives in work organization that
result from the high malleability of new technology and work arrangements
like teamwork, which inevitably raise questions of interest whenever questions
of efficiency are raised, and give rise to a need to settle both kinds of questions
simultaneously, rapidly, and on a day-to-day basis, at all organizational levels
and not just at the top of the organization.
In post-Fordist firms, that is, consultation on production needs and represen-
tation of worker interests tend to be even less separable than in traditional work
organizations. Where under a system of decentralized competence, major pro-
duction decisions are made, not by "management," but by workers as part of
their routine work assignments, consultation between workers and manage-332 Wolfgang Streeck
merit on how to increase efficiency becomes impossible to keep apart from ne-
gotiations on the mutual accommodation of interests. In flexible work organi-
zations, effective interest representation, be it by works councils or by unions,
requires deep technical and managerial knowledge that can only be gained
through consultation, as well as day-to-day influence of workforces on the or-
ganization of work at all levels through ongoing consultation or, better, co-
determination. As a consequence, unions as representative organizations can
be expected to develop an interest in becoming involved in consultation over
productive cooperation even if they have rejected such involvement in the past.
Similarly, efficient production in post-Fordist organizations requires integra-
tion and accommodation of workforce interests, typically in an "organizational
culture" that can substitute for prescriptive bureaucratic rules and centralized
decisions. Managements, for their part, are therefore likely to become inter-
ested in having partners for consultation that can also represent the interests
of workers and commit the workforce as a collectivity even if in the past they
had been strongly opposed to any collective expression of interests at the work-
place.
The observed fusion, then, of consultative functions into representational
structures, as in Italy and Sweden, or of representative functions into consulta-
tive structures, as in Germany and the Netherlands, would seem to reflect a
realization on the part of management of the importance for consensual pro-
duction of effective representation, and on the part of unions of the importance
for effective representation of being involved in productive cooperation. As we
have seen, the new configuration of consultation and representation developed
unevenly, depending among other things on existing institutional conditions
and ideological worldviews.
1
2 A country like Germany that, more or less by
accident, happened to have the right structures in place when the need arose
was economically advantaged by it. In Sweden and Italy, the logic of post-
Fordist production requirements asserted itself even against the institutional
odds and resulted in a renaissance of consultation within primarily adversarial
institutions. In France, on the other hand, and certainly in Spain, employers
continued to oppose representative institutions at the workplace, while unions
did not see it as their task to become involved in the management of produc-
12. But elements of it are present even in countries where one would not have expected them.
As Paul Marginson pointed out in a lecture in December 1993, drawing on two recent, comprehen-
sive surveys of workplace industrial relations in Britain, joint consultative committees of manage-
ment and labor are present in no more than 25 percent of British workplaces. Where workforces
are unionized, however, i.e., where there is institutionalized interest representation to supplement
consultation, joint consultative committees are twice as common as in nonunionized workplaces.
Among large companies, group-level consultative committees exist in 75 percent of firms where
unions are recognized at all establishments but only in 45 percent of firms where they are recog-
nized at none. And direct forms of participation, such as team meetings and quality circles, are
more common in unionized than in nonunionized settings, and in large companies they are particu-
larly frequent where unions are recognized throughout and where there is in addition a group-level
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tion; here the transition to a post-Fordist mode of organization, with the com-
petitive advantages it entails, proceeded less smoothly.
In any case, what happened in the 1970s and 1980s in continental European
industrial relations systems was the rise of a new system of workplace partici-
pation, sustained by either unionized works councils or "councilized" work-
place unions, through collective bodies at the plant and enterprise level as well
as directly on the job, that differed from postwar consultation in that it included
a strong element of worker interest representation. But it also differed from
the traditional mode of interest representation in industrial relations, collective
bargaining, in that it did not extend to and remained carefully insulated from
wage setting; operated on the basis of legal or contractual rights to information,
consultation, and co-determination rather than the power to strike; and was
primarily concerned with negotiating consensus on the myriad of qualitative
microdecisions required in a flexible, post-Taylorist organization of work.
Functionally, the emerging new form of workplace participation, in some
countries more and in others less, supported a new kind of cooperation be-
tween management and labor at the point of production: a kind of cooperation
that consists in the mutual accommodation of interests through institutional
arrangements for continuous co-decision making and co-determination, as op-
posed to both the passive acquiescence of workforces to employer decisions
under the old, often paternalistic consultation regimes, and distributive conflict
over the results of productive cooperation.
11.6 Role of Unions and Wage Bargaining
What institutional conditions favor representative participation at the work-
place, and what are the consequences of different forms of workplace indus-
trial relations for unions, employers, and economic performance? Beginning
with unions, it would seem that union strength and unity are important factors
for successful blending of consultation and representation. In France and
Spain, where representative consultation is least developed, unions are far
weaker and interunion competition is stronger than in the four other countries
(table 11.2). In Sweden, by comparison, union strength ensures the representa-
tiveness of council-like consultative arrangements, although increasingly com-
petitive multiunionism invites employer attempts to weaken external union
influence through "coworker agreements." Near-monolithic union unity in
Germany helps compensate for no more than moderate union density, whereas
in Italy potentially strong interunion competition would seem to make repre-
sentative consultation somewhat less stable and effective than in Germany or
Sweden.
The impact on the unions of different institutional forms at the workplace is
difficult to discern. In Germany as well as Italy, participation in works-
council-like structures—legally based in the former and union based in theJ2 a
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latter country—is said to have both increased union density and, to different
degrees, helped contain competition. In Sweden, density has recently been
growing even further, at a time when unions have become ever more widely
and deeply involved in workplace participation. And in France and Spain, den-
sity has been rapidly falling, amid sharp interunion conflict and with represen-
tative consultation hardly developed. In fact, in Spain the legal institutionaliza-
tion of works councils may have caused union substitution effects. Union
substitution is also suggested in the Netherlands, where, unlike in Spain, work-
place industrial relations are relatively cooperative. More important than con-
flict and cooperation, however, seems to be that in both countries, and in
France as well, interunion competition prevents unions from using their posi-
tions on works councils for the recruitment of members—which is common,
although at best semilegal, in Germany. In Italy and Sweden, of course, the
problem does not pose itself because workplace representation is institution-
ally union based—which regardless of multiunionism gives all major unions
an opportunity to benefit organizationally from councils.
1
3
Nonmembers of unions are numerically important on works councils in the
Netherlands and France, where density is low, competition is strong or very
strong, and councils are legally based (table 11.2). Note, however, that the
same conditions apply in Spain, where unorganized council members, even
including members of small, "nonrepresentative" unions, are much less fre-
quent. The difference may be due to the closer institutional links between
councils and unions in Spain, as indicated by the legal provision for direct
union delegates to councils, which parallels the Italian situation and generally
underlines the de facto character of Spanish works councils as unified—or
better, federated—union workplace organizations, rather than a "second chan-
nel" of representation. With higher union density and less interunion competi-
tion, German works councils have fewer nonorganized members than Dutch
and French councils, but being genuine second-channel institutions they have
more than Spanish councils. In Sweden and Italy, unorganized membership is
not a problem because councils are union based, although Italian unions do as
a matter of policy accept unorganized workers as works councils members. In
all countries, whatever the institutional base, nonmembers of unions are less
frequent among works councillors than among the workforce at large, with
unions under all institutional arrangements routinely winning a share of coun-
cil seats that comfortably exceeds their density ratio.
Union workplace organizations distinct from works councils are more likely
to exist where the fusion of representation and consultation is least advanced
(table 11.2). In France and Spain, competing unions usually have their own
workplace branches, low density rates permitting. In the Netherlands, by com-
13. In other words, legally based councils seem to benefit unitary union movements but weaken
divided unions, and unions in competitive union systems have a greater interest in councils being
union based than do unions in unitary systems.336 Wolfgang Streeck
parison, union branches are rare in spite of considerable union competition,
probably because legally well-resourced councils absorb and satisfy most rep-
resentational needs. In Germany, the system of Vertrauensleute has typically
evolved into an organizational infrastructure for the works council, to the ex-
tent that the latter became more representative and was adopted by the unions
as their chosen instrument for workplace interest representation. Swedish
unions do have separate workplace branches ("clubs"), but it is exclusively
these that control consultation and cooperation, as well as make up any specific
bodies created for that purpose. In Italy, separate union branches emerge when
interunion competition intensifies, indicating a potential weak spot in the Ital-
ian pattern of unified union workplace organizations operating as de facto
works councils.
Comparing the six countries, it is less than completely clear whether and
to what extent decentralized wage bargaining interferes with representative
participation (table 11.2). Looking only at Germany and Spain, the conclusion
seems to offer itself that works councils can be agents of such participation
only if they are not involved in wage bargaining.
1
4 Until some time ago, the
Netherlands and Sweden would have easily confirmed this. Recently, however,
wage bargaining has become less centralized in those two countries, and while
this may be the beginning of the end of representative consultation, it is far
from clear that it must. Note that in Italy, councils sometimes do act as wage
bargainers without, apparently, having to give up their role as agents of work-
place participation. Also, the French case shows, e contrario, that excluding
councils from wage bargaining as such does not yet ensure that consultation
will become representative. What the six cases would seem to suggest is that
the important factor may not be whether councils do or do not act as wage
bargainers, but the extent to which wage bargaining is centrally coordinated—
as, for example, in Italy, where wage bargaining may be deliberately shifted to
the enterprise level by the national union confederations in response to chang-
ing political and economic conditions but can be recentralized if required by
new circumstances.
External union control over works councils is always precarious and never
fully assured, but this applies to union workplace organizations in general,
institutionalized as works councils or not. Subtle and less subtle power strug-
gles between external unions and workplace representatives take place even in
the two union-based systems, Sweden and Italy. Organized in whatever form,
institutions of workplace representation will always give expression to interests
that must appear "particularistic" from an external union perspective, espe-
cially to the extent that they are not exclusively distributive. Whether Swedish,
14. Of course, German works councils do play a role in wage bargaining, but only marginally,
tacitly, and mostly illicitly. While that role has recently grown somewhat, the important point is
that German councils cannot call strikes over wages, which inevitably makes their activities in this
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Italian, or German external unions have more control over interest articulation
and labor-management cooperation at the workplace is therefore an open ques-
tion that cannot be decided simply with reference to the three countries' differ-
ent legal and organizational conditions.
Even where workplace industrial relations are conducted through works
councils formally separate from unions, the latter are given a range of privi-
leges inside the council system to ensure its representativeness, to prevent it
from obstructing unions as organizations, and perhaps to buy unions' acquies-
cence to legal intervention. In Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain,
election rules give large national unions sometimes massive advantage over
splinter or nonunion groups. Also, external union officials have legally based
rights of access to councils and council meetings, formally to offer advice, but
de facto also to influence council policies. Typically, councils are obliged in
law to consult and cooperate, not just with the employer, but also with the
unions. In most countries, they also have the right as well as the duty to help
national unions with the local enforcement of legal regulations and industrial
agreements, enabling unions indirectly to define a potentially large part of the
councils' agenda.
There also is in general an intense exchange of material support between
unions and works councils. While works councils differ in size (table 11.3),
most of their seats are taken by union members. Council legislation thus cre-
ates a large number of legally protected positions (see table 11.4, last column)
to which union activists may be elected and in which they may conduct not
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independent councils are actually not much different from legally protected
union workplace organizations. Unions benefit in particular from the legal
rights of council members to be released from work at full pay. To the extent
that the operating costs of councils are borne by the employer as part of the
general costs of workplace governance, council legislation de facto provides
for mandatory subsidies from employers to unions, or for a union tax on busi-
nesses. For example, where the law gives council members the right to receive
training for their functions, employers may have to pay their wages while they
attend union training courses, and may even have to pay the course fees.
That unions should benefit from works councils is an inevitable conse-
quence of the de facto unionization of statutory council systems in the 1970s
and 1980s, which made consultation more representative and thereby revital-
ized it. Where councils are not formally union bodies, unions may have to offer
them technical assistance, expert advice, training, and so forth, in exchange for
being allowed to share in their material or political resources. In Germany,
national union headquarters invest considerable effort in maintaining connec-
tions with the works councils of large firms; smaller firms are serviced by re-
gional or local union offices. Works councils that can find other sources of
support may be less inclined to subsidize the unions and would tend to be more
politically independent. In Italy, on the other hand, where council resources
are formally union resources, it seems that councils sometimes receive mate-
rial support from the external union.
It is hard to say in which country's unions derive the highest material benefits
from councils. Germany and the Netherlands come to mind where works coun-
cils have extensive rights to financial support from the employer. But in both
countries the unions must in turn be useful to the councils; otherwise, councils
may refuse to share their resources with them. German unions especially are
forced to expend vast resources on providing councils with advice and guid-
ance on a current basis. In Spain, and partly in Italy, the large size of councils
(table 11.3) may point to certain clientelistic functions of the council system,
especially in Spain where during the transition the activists of two large, com-
peting unions seem to have been bought into gradualistic reform by large-scale
paid release from work at the expense of the employers. French unions, by
comparison, seem to draw relatively little organizational benefit from enter-
prise committees, but then they may not have to given the existence of the, also
legally based, union delegates.
11.7 Role of Legal Intervention
As has been noted, in no country is the institutionalization of workplace
representation, either as such or fused into consultative practices, left to em-
ployers' self-interest or paternalistic sense of obligation. Works councils in
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain, and union workplace branches
in France, Sweden, and Italy, are not legally mandated, so there may be work-340 Wolfgang Streeck
places where they do not exist. But setting them up is easy as it requires no
more than pro forma triggering activities by external unions or a very small
proportion of the workforce. What is important is that employers are barred
from interfering and indeed play no role at all in the process save an entirely
passive one. Typically, employers obstructing the creation of a works council
or a union workplace branch are threatened with severe legal sanctions. While
all legal systems allow for residual voluntary elements in setting up workplace
representation, that voluntarism applies exclusively to labor.
Similarly, once councils or legally protected union branches have come into
being, they may fall by the wayside or wither away due to lack of interest
among workers or lack of attention and resources on the part of external
unions. But there is no way for an employer to demand or bring about their
formal disbandment. Once set up, legally protected representational bodies
cannot formally be undone, not even by a majority of the workforce since this
would deprive the minority of essential rights of industrial citizenship. For all
practical purposes, works councils are permanent bodies, very much like city
councils, and are viewed as such by both unions and employers. For employers
in particular, attempting to make an existing council or union branch go away
must seem futile, and in fact such attempts are so rare that they are never even
mentioned in any of the country papers.
Another important function of legal intervention is to make representation
universal, that is, to take it out of economic competition between firms. In all
six countries, the percentage of the national workforce that is legally eligible
for workplace representation is high (table 11.4). Countries differ most in their
ambition to cover not just large but also small firms; often, as in Germany,
France, and Spain, very small workplaces come under a somewhat different,
less formally regulated regime. Actual coverage varies everywhere with the
size of workplaces; as firms or plants get larger, coverage rapidly approaches
100 percent. Given the mixture that has developed in all European countries
of voluntary and statutory elements in workplace representation, it is not sur-
prising that actual coverage is affected by union strength, as in France and
Spain where weak unions make for less than complete coverage even in the
larger firms.
Other typical subjects of legal regulation are the resources that representa-
tive bodies are entitled to receive from employers; the rights of unions vis-a-
vis legally based works councils where these exist; and the rights and obliga-
tions of councils or, where applicable, union workplace organizations in repre-
senting the workforce in relation to management, especially with respect to
the exercise of managerial prerogative (table 11.5). Note that even in Sweden,
the resources that employers have to provide for workplace representation are
determined by law, in particular the Shop Stewards Act. Legislation typically
sets a minimum to which representative bodies are entitled, allowing additional
resources to be negotiated. Legal regulation of the employer's contribution is













































































Note: See table 11.1 for country abbreviations.
"Councils have limited influence on the selection of newly appointed board members, and may
reject co-opted members.
bBy national agreement.
cBy workplace agreement, with increasing frequency.
dFor union workplace representatives under the Shop Stewards Act.
costs of workplace representation out of competition but also because it pro-
tects the independence of representative bodies: if resources are received as a
matter of right, they cannot be used by the employer to extract concessions.
Legal entitlements thus help protect a council's or workplace union's legiti-
macy. Incidentally, all national systems assume that effective representative
consultation is part of the governance of the firm and that its costs are therefore
rightly paid by the employer, just as the costs of management. All systems also
treat workplace participation as a collective good for the workforce, that is,
one that the workforce cannot be expected to finance by voluntary contribu-
tions even though the workforce benefits from it.
Second, where the law creates union-independent bodies of workplace con-
sultation or participation, legislators usually find it necessary to regulate in
considerable detail their relationship to the unions, that is, the intersection of
statutory and voluntary representation. Substantively, these regulations vary
between countries, depending on the structure of unionism and the character of
legally based institutions. As pointed out, union access to councils and council
resources always receives strong legal attention as it concerns directly the way
representation through unions is connected to consultation between workforce
and employer, and to participation of workers in management.
Third, the law may regulate, more or less specifically, the representational
rights and cooperative obligations of participation bodies vis-a-vis the em-
ployer. Where legislation lays down only broad principles or limits itself to342 Wolfgang Streeck
securing union rights, as in Italy and Sweden, information, consultation, and
co-determination rights of workplace bodies may have to be specified by col-
lective agreement; alternatively, interference with managerial prerogative may
take place informally depending on local power relations. Where the law is
very detailed, as in Germany and the Netherlands, and to some extent in France
and Spain, employers tend to refuse negotiations over further participation
rights, although at least in Germany expansion of such rights by collective
agreement would be legally possible.
1
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The most important difference between national systems seems to be the
presence or absence of co-determination rights for works councils (table 11.5).
Where there are no such rights, the capacity of councils to veto or delay em-
ployer decisions depends entirely on the local or economic conjunctural power
balance. In Italy, post-Fordist representation-cum-consultation seems to work
without any formal co-determination rights of workplace unions or works
councils; note, however, the recent demands by unions for some sort of indus-
trial democracy legislation. The weaker councils of France and Spain have
control over the social funds of firms, whereas stronger councils do not.
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While German works councils can draw on representation on company super-
visory boards as an important additional institutional resource, there is no
board representation in Italy and Spain, and only weak versions of it in the
Netherlands, France, and Sweden, making the relationship between board rep-
resentation and council strength hard to determine (table 11.5). All councils
are in different ways involved in the local enforcement of applicable legislation
and collective agreements, from which some draw considerable political and
organizational strength.
Legal rights for works councils to information, consultation, and co-
determination tend to be coupled with, and conditional on, legal obligations to
cooperate with the employer in good faith, for example, to respect business
secrets and not to engage in, as the English translation of the German Works
Constitution Act puts it, "acts of industrial warfare." Such obligations are to
ensure that councils do not become exclusively representative bodies and con-
tinue to attend also to functional needs for consultation and cooperation. Union
workplace organizations are usually not placed under obligations of this kind,
which is why some unions, for example, in Italy or France, prefer them over
councils even though councils might give them more influence over the exer-
cise of managerial prerogative. (Swedish unions, to the extent that they draw
on their legal right to initiate co-determination procedures, are under a general
15. Rather than by collective bargaining, works council rights in Germany, and to some extent
the Netherlands, are often extended by councils using legal co-determination rights to extract in-
formal managerial commitments to consultation or de facto co-determination on other, unrelated
subjects that the law has left under managerial discretion.
16. German councils do, however, have a legal right to full co-determination over company
social policy and sometimes to the dismay of the unions become involved in running the cafeteria
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obligation to respect the economic needs of the firm, which is further elabo-
rated by the national industrial Agreement on Efficiency and Productivity.)
It should be noted, however, that the absence of a legal "peace obligation"
does not necessarily preclude cooperation, as demonstrated by the Italian case.
Similarly, a legal obligation for works councils to engage in vertrauensvolle
Zusammenarbeit (trustful cooperation) does not preclude conflict; most unof-
ficial strikes in Germany are more or less openly led by works council mem-
bers, with employers usually refraining from invoking the legal sanctions that
exist for this. In Germany at least, the real functions of the peace obligation
for councils seem to be related, not primarily to the relationship between works
council and employer, but to that between the works council, as a de facto
union workplace organization, and the union: by barring councils from calling
official strikes and making it difficult although not impossible for them to call
unofficial strikes, the law helps external unions preserve their strike monopoly.
In this respect, the peace obligation serves a similar function as the legal prohi-
bition on works councils engaging in wage bargaining.
11.8 Workplace Participation and Economic Performance
The contribution of representative consultation to economic performance,
through works councils or union workplace organizations, is hard to establish
quantitatively. There is in European systems no equivalent to the American
nonunionized sector with which exact comparison (as, e.g., in Freeman and
Medoff 1984) could be attempted: almost all firms in a country have basically
the same or similar workplace institutions.
1
7 Moreover, much of the economi-
cally beneficial influence of works councils, if it exists, is very likely to be in
the fuzzy area of "X-efficiency" (Leibenstein 1987) where causes and effects
are not easily traced.
Lack of quantifiability, however, does not mean that, as Gertrude Stein ob-
served when visiting Oakland, California, "there is no there there." While inter-
national comparisons, especially in an age of economic interdependence, are
not without considerable problems, one may note the conspicuous absence of
representative consultation and effective workplace participation in such coun-
tries as Britain and the United States, whose economies have suffered most
since the watershed of the 1970s, and its strong presence in Germany, Sweden,
and Italy. To the latter list one may add Japan, where consultation, although
17. Econometric studies sometimes try to compare economic performance before and after ma-
jor pieces of workplace legislation. The problems with this include the inevitably small number
of yearly observations and the simultaneous influence of other factors, such as business cycles or
exchange rates. Alternatively, one may use as the independent variable variations within one coun-
try in specific properties of workplace institutions to look for covariations with performance indi-
cators such as productivity or profitability. One problem here is that the extent to which national
systems allow for meaningful interfirm variations itself varies between countries. There also are
conceptual difficulties of how exactly to specify the independent variable, as well as practical
difficulties of access to reliable performance data.344 Wolfgang Streeck
probably more paternalistic than representative, seems to be standard manage-
rial practice.
At the level of descriptive plausibility, the country studies in this volume
suggest several ways in which the parallel evolution of representative consulta-
tion in European countries over the last two decades may have virtuously re-
sponded to economic needs and may have helped these countries master the
challenges of post-Fordism. Such accounts receive some if not conclusive vali-
dation from the fact that, where representative participation is strongly estab-
lished, employers often and typically express their satisfaction with it.
1
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example is the advice given to German employers by their central research
institute to consider the works council as a "factor of production" and an essen-
tial agent of information and communication within the firm: an institution
that cuts transaction costs, improves the working atmosphere, and consolidates
social consensus. Similarly, for Sweden it is reported that employers have made
their peace with the Co-Determination Act and have come to accept "employee
and union representation in the change process," with the—American—CEO
of Saab stating after the firm's successful reorganization that "weaker unions
would not have helped, to the contrary" (Brulin, chap. 7 in this volume).
1
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Expressions of employer satisfaction are also reported from the Netherlands
and Italy. In the latter country, the widespread existence of informal participa-
tion arrangements may be interpreted, to quote, as "factual recognition of the
importance of institutionalized workforce representation in the management of
production"—a recognition that is all the more remarkable since it is "in sharp
contrast to the official positions of both the external unions.and the employers'
associations" (Regalia, chap. 8 in this volume). The confession of an Italian
manager that, "if works councils didn't already exist, one should invent them,"
is reported to have been made in exactly the same words by a German employer
and might as well have been heard from Dutch or Swedish employers.
More specifically, the papers in this volume mention a number of ways in
which representative consultation contributes to economic performance. First,
all papers point out that works councils, or council-like structures, improve the
flow of communication both from the workforce to management and vice versa.
As good communication is vital for modern business enterprises, this is widely
regarded as extremely important. Second, especially the Dutch and the Ger-
man chapters emphasize that councils improve the quality of decisions, though
sometimes delaying them; as well-resourced councils can ask detailed ques-
tions and offer counterproposals, managements must scrutinize their own proj-
ects more, making it more likely that flaws are discovered early and that the
range of alternatives is enlarged. Third, representative consultation facilitates
18. Validation is not conclusive because one must never underestimate the capacity of interview-
ees for verbal opportunism.
19. Note that the Swedish central agreement of 1982 on the implementation of the Co-
Determination Act is called the "Agreement on Efficiency and Participation," in this order (empha-
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the implementation of decisions, something that is emphasized in the Dutch
and Italian country studies especially: a management decision that has been
made with representative informational and political input from the workforce
is more easily carried out later, and this may more than make up for the longer
decision time.
Fourth, councils in all countries, perhaps with the exception of Spain, have
been found to place pressure on firms to rationalize their human resource poli-
cies, expand their time horizon, and emphasize the creation and retention of
high and broad skills. In this respect, works councils and unions seem to have
been a major source of organizational innovation, something that is perhaps
particularly visible in the case of German co-determination. Fifth, the Swedish
and Spanish chapters mention a contribution of workplace participation to re-
ducing absenteeism. Sixth, apparently participation helps firms handle worker
grievances, not least by encouraging workers to come forward and speak up
without fear of retribution. Apart from its negative impact on social peace,
worker dissatisfaction may be indicative of general organizational deficiencies,
and by expressing themselves workers may add importantly to the information
of top management. Seventh, participation also provides feedback on its middle
management to the top of the organization, something that is mentioned in the
Italian study especially. Eighth, the Dutch study emphasizes the advantages
of works councils for a customized and flexible, that is, locally negotiated,
implementation of regulatory law, something that is likely also to apply in most
other countries.
Representative consultation seems to have been particularly useful to firms
that try to move to & flexible and decentralized organization of work and deci-
sion making. This conclusion is far from trivial since especially well institu-
tionalized works councils have often been expected to object to the delegation
of managerial decision rights to the shop floor, for example, to semiautono-
mous working groups, on the ground that this would reduce the capacity of
their management counterparts to negotiate with them. Indications are that at
least German works councils in fact did at first resist work groups and "quality
circles" for such reasons. In recent years, however, this has dramatically
changed, and works councils in Germany, just as in Sweden and Italy, have
become forceful and active proponents of, to use the Swedish term, "work
development." Especially in Sweden, but also in other countries, decentraliza-
tion of competence and the introduction of semiautonomous work groups have
been found to be easier if they are negotiated with a collective representative
of the workforce, instead of unilaterally imposed; see the case of Fiat, where
management resumed talking to the union workplace organization at the mo-
ment when it began to implement its "total quality" strategy. The Swedish pa-
per in particular shows how strong representation combined with consultative
arrangements may sustain a "cooperative culture" within which experimenta-
tion with decentralized organizational structures can flourish—structures
whose introduction is often embraced by the unions as their own objective.346 Wolfgang Streeck
It is worth noting that the French paper reports, not just union weakness,
employer resistance to representation, and an impasse in the development of
workplace participation, but also a lag in the post-Fordist transformation of
work organization. That there may be a more than accidental association be-
tween the two is hinted by the Spanish case, where in a largely outdated indus-
trial structure, employers continue to resist the inclusion of works councils in
the governance of the workplace and prefer to rely on their hierarchical powers,
while works councils are preoccupied with union business pure and simple and
have little confidence in employers. Nevertheless, the French chapter reports
that councils have at least helped recast the balance between central and local
regulation, especially of working time and technology, and have sometimes
been a factor in the modernization of the human resource policies of French
companies by impressing on them the need to invest in skills and general
adaptability.
None of the West European papers discusses the extent to which works
council influence may detract from economic performance by giving rise to
joint rent seeking or politically prudent but economically self-destructive
avoidance of tough decisions. On the other hand, examples abound in the pa-
pers and in the literature at large of firms seeking and receiving the support of
a strong union or works council in implementing severe capacity cuts,
working-time reductions, or productivity drives in response to a deep eco-
nomic crisis. The case of the Swedish firm, Saab, is only one among many
where representative consultation enabled managements to embark on funda-
mental change without losing control over it or destroying the allegiance to the
firm of the remaining workforce.
As to rent seeking, all of the chapters focus on firms in the internationally
highly competitive manufacturing sector. In such firms, difficult global market
conditions serve as a powerful constraint on whatever deals management and
labor may make with each other.
2
0 Quite possibly, the economically benevolent
effects of strong representative institutions at the workplace may be condi-
tional on competitive markets and a tough competition policy, as has been
argued for the German case (Streeck 1989). Strong unions or works councils
may have less desirable consequences in the public sector, where there is no or
much less competition. But this is a separate subject not covered by this
volume.
20. Note that Italian, German, and Swedish manufacturing are far more internationally exposed
than manufacturing in the United States. In fact, rather than devices for rent seeking, the new
representative-consultative arrangements that emerged in European economies in the 1970s and
1980s constitute a nonprotectionist response to intensified international competition, aimed at in-
creasing the performance of national firms through improved cooperation between workers and
management, allowing for continuous restructuring of production processes.347 Works Councils in Western Europe: From Consultation to Participation
11.9 Summary
Postwar industrial relations in Western Europe set out with an institutional-
ized bifurcation between adversarial collective bargaining through unions at
the sectoral or national level and cooperative consultation through works coun-
cils at the workplace. Works councils were based either in law or in national
collective agreement. However, where they had no representational functions,
which was the case almost everywhere outside West Germany and, to some
extent, the Netherlands, they tended to fall in disuse during the 1950s and
1960s. Simultaneously, a representation gap opened in European workplaces
that was related to the inability of both centralized unions and nonrepresenta-
tive councils to take up the growing discontent of workers with Taylorist ratio-
nalization.
The explosions of 1968 and 1969 made the development of accountable
systems of workplace representation for workers a major concern for public
policy as well as for unions and employers. Governments strengthened work-
place representation either by legal support for union workplace organizations
or by improving the rights of works councils and their links to the unions. In
later years, it turned out that the resulting new representative arrangements
at the workplace responded fortuitously to the requirements of post-Taylorist
industrial restructuring, especially where they were from the beginning con-
nected with still viable structures of cooperative consultation, such as German
works councils. Where such structures had dwindled away, they were in subse-
quent years rebuilt either by well-established unions, as in Sweden and Italy,
or by legislation. The outcome was a remarkable convergence of European
industrial relations systems on a pattern of representative consultation—or
participation—at the workplace, promoted by public policy, infused with
union influence, and more or less willingly accepted by employers.
Western European systems of representative consultation are kept strictly
apart from collective wage bargaining; otherwise, however, their operation is
closely linked to unionism, and such links are encouraged by legislation. Legal
intervention is used to take the main parameters of workplace participation out
of contention between management and labor, as well as out of competition
between individual firms. Major details, however, are left to joint regulation
between employers and unions, at the national or at the workplace level. While
the economic effects of workplace participation are hard to determine statisti-
cally, there are good reasons to believe that participation contributes in a vari-
ety of ways to efficient workplace governance and thereby to the dynamic effi-
ciency of firms in uncertain economic, technological, and social conditions.348 Wolfgang Streeck
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